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Abstract
The role of multilateral donor agencies in global health is a new area of research, with limited research on how
these agencies differ in terms of their governance arrangements, especially in relation to transparency,
inclusiveness, accountability, and responsiveness to civil society. We argue that historical analysis of the origins of
these agencies and their coalition formation processes can help to explain these differences. We propose an
analytical approach that links the theoretical literature discussing institutional origins to path dependency and
institutional theory relating to proto institutions in order to illustrate the differences in coalition formation processes
that shape governance within four multilateral agencies involved in global health. We find that two new
multilateral donor agencies that were created by a diverse coalition of state and non-state actors, such as the
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria and GAVI, what we call proto-institutions, were more adaptive
in strengthening their governance processes. This contrasts with two well-established multilateral donor agencies,
such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, what we call Bretton Woods (BW) institutions, which
were created by nation states alone; and hence, have different origins and consequently different path dependent
processes.
Introduction
The governance and responsiveness of multilateral
donor agencies working in the area of global health is an
emerging area of research. Since 2000, coinciding with
the creation of Millennium Development Goals and in-
creased overseas development assistance for health, the
importance of these agencies in combating diseases and
poverty has increased. Yet, there is limited research ex-
ploring how these agencies have organized themselves to
improve their effectiveness and to meet the health re-
lated Millennium Development Goals.
Earlier studies indicate that multilateral funders, such
as the World Bank, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tu-
berculosis and Malaria (Global Fund), and the Global
Alliance for Vaccines Initiative (GAVI) have attempted
to reform their governance arrangements in order to im-
prove transparency, accountability, and responsiveness
to countries and citizens’ healthcare needs in response
to pressures from governments and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) [1-5]. However, extant research
also highlights wide variation in the outcomes of govern-
ance reforms undertaken by multilateral donor agencies,
with studies suggesting that the governing boards of
these agencies have failed to improve transparency in
their decision-making, to consistently engage NGOs and
other stakeholders in decision-making, and to expand
broad representation and voting influence within
governing boards; suggesting obfuscation and use of ‘im-
munity’ privileges have hampered change efforts and to
hold individuals within these agencies accountable for
wrongdoing, underperformance or mismanagement [6].
Hence, it is not clear whether multilateral donors have
increased transparency, representation and inclusiveness,
accountability and responsiveness to country and civil
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study as strengthened governance processes, which is the
primary outcome of interest in this paper.
a
Specifically, we find that multilateral donor agencies,
which have their origins in Bretton Woods (BW) Institu-
tions, and United Nations agencies which have evolved
with the Bretton Woods philosophy, have struggled to
fully achieve strengthened governance processes. Agen-
cies such as the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank emerged following the meetings in 1944 of
many nation states in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire,
USA. Broadly, BW Institutions also include multilateral
agencies, such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB),
the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and the
African Development Bank, that have emerged subse-
quently, but share distinct similarities with the
organizational structure and goals of the World Bank.
Another common feature shared by the BW institutions
is that they were created by influential and wealthy
nation states, such as the United States, the United
Kingdom, and Japan.
Since 2000, new multilateral agencies in global health
have emerged with features that differ from BW institu-
tions. These new agencies have not followed the typical
evolutionary path of BW Institutions. Instead, the ideas
guiding their creation have emanated not from political
elites of nation states, as was the case with BW institu-
tions, but from the interests and strategies of a range of
non-state actors. Following Lawrence et al. [7], we refer
to these agencies as proto-institutions, where the rules of
governance within agencies were created by extensive
collaboration and coordination between civil society
groups. Rules of governance within agencies reflect their
interests, in turn helping ensure strengthened govern-
ance processes with broadened accountability to mul-
tiple stakeholders.
Two examples of these proto-institutions include the
Global Fund and GAVI, which were established in 2000
and 2002, respectively. An important distinguishing fea-
ture of these proto-institutions is that they appear com-
mitted to implementing policies aimed at increasing
their decision-making transparency, their representation
of a broad range of stakeholders that include civil society
(i.e., individuals in need of healthcare, individuals and
communities affected by communicable and non-
communicable diseases, as well as a range of non-
governmental organizations that advocate for their
needs), private foundations, and the private sector in
their decision-making processes.
The emergence of multilateral proto-institutions
warrants research into explaining why and how they
have diverged from the Bretton Woods institutions.
Indeed our key research question in this article is the
following: what accounts for differences in strengthened
governance processes between the newer proto-
institutions as compared with multilateral agencies that
are Bretton Woods institutions? We argue that under-
standing these differences requires the application of
theoretical frameworks capturing these agencies’ origins
and policy evolution. Our research, therefore, breaks
new ground because to our knowledge, it is the first at-
tempt to apply and use institutional theory to explain
differences in outcomes between multilateral donor
agencies in global health.
In this article, in contrast to studies which have ex-
plored the importance of endogenous organizational in-
terests for achieving these governance outcomes within
multilateral donor agencies, often kindled by well orga-
nized, pro-active civic mobilization and pressures
[1-3,5,6,8,9], we draw on research on institutional ori-
gins, proto-institutions, and path dependency theory to
explain the creation and implementation of strengthened
governance processes within multilateral donor agencies.
While institutional origins and proto-institutional theory
help to explain the initiating political actors, interests,
and coalitional strategies involved in creating multilat-
eral donor agencies, path dependency theory helps to ex-
plain how and why actors within these agencies behave
the way they do after they have been created, e.g., why
agency presidents and governing board members repeat-
edly were unable to change ineffective governance pro-
cesses, rules and policies.
We propose a testable hypothesis: that the emergence
of strengthened governance process depends on the
types of actors, interests, and coalitions involved in the
historic formation of multilateral donor agencies in glo-
bal health. More specifically, our proposition is that
multilateral agencies created by a single or small group
of influential, predominant, industrialized nations devis-
ing coalitions of reform and have origins rooted in
Bretton Woods ethos have been less successful in
achieving strengthened governance processes. Con-
versely, multilateral donor agencies created by the strong
involvement of civil society, with the support of other
non-state actors, such as the private sector, will lead to
new interests and reform coalitions creating agencies
that are more successful in achieving strengthened
governance processes. But what our argument
b seems
to suggest, and what the relevant literature has essen-
tially ignored, is that multilateral agency performance in
these strengthened governance processes is historically
predetermined, with little prospect for concrete reforms
within BW Institutions, that is, the willingness to imple-
ment and more importantly, remain committed to and
enforce policies that strengthen these processes. While
all four agencies studied were successful in imple-
menting new governance policies, the Global Fund and
GAVI demonstrated a persistent commitment to
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decision-making information for increased transparency,
accountability to civil society by including civil society
and other non-state actors in multiple governance levels,
from governing boards to board committees, as well as
in-country coordination mechanisms, frequently meeting
with civil society, and ensuring that civil society views
and interests of other key stakeholders were consistently
included in policymaking processes.
c
Methods
Our study drew on analysis of the published literature and
publicly available data from journal articles, books, agency
web cites and publication, media, and research reports.
We compared the World Bank, ADB, Global Fund, and
GAVI. There were, inter alia, three main reasons for pur-
posively selecting these cases for comparison. First, we
were very familiar with these cases, being familiar with
their reform efforts, having conducted and published re-
search on them, as well working within them, e.g., the
World Bank and the Global Fund; moreover, instead of
comparing other UN regional banks and global funding
initiatives, writing about cases that we were familiar with
allowed us to provide rich causal detail and case study
illustrations, an approach that helps to illuminate the po-
tential utility of a proposed theoretical approach [10,11].
Second, we selected these four cases because we had a
strong expectation of the differences in outcomes of re-
form processes and the strengthened governance pro-
cesses between them; thus allowing us to provide
alternative explanations for the factors leading to these
governance outcomes. Purposive selection of cases based
on known outcomes is justifiable when scholars strive to
provide new theoretical insights into the causes leading
to these known outcomes [10,12].
And third, with respect to the Global Fund and GAVI,
we choose these cases because they were the most
established agencies of their kind (i.e., non-UN multilat-
eral financiers of global health) with global reach. We
were, hence, able to obtain information about their gov-
ernance structure and policy performance over a sub-
stantial period of time. Other non-UN multilateral
financiers providing drugs and funding for diagnostics
were created at later points in time, such as UNITAID
in 2006. There exist other multi-lateral agencies, public-
private partnerships, and philanthropic initiatives, which
we could have examined. However, in order to provide a
focused, in-depth discussion, and for the aforementioned
reasons, we restricted our analysis to the World Bank,
ADB, Global Fund, and GAVI.
Approaches to multilateral agency governance
The role of multilateral agencies in global health and their
transformation to increase transparency, representation,
accountability and responsiveness to country and civil so-
cietal health needs is a new area of scholarly research. Civil
societal health needs represent individuals’ needs for ac-
cess to medication, healthcare treatment, as well as infor-
mation for awareness and prevention. These individuals
often include persons who are at high risk of illness, but
who cannot afford medications or healthcare services.
Country health needs refer to governmental and societal
needs in providing essential medicines, funding for pre-
vention, treatment, as well as strengthening health systems
and the delivery of medications.
Increasingly, a number of scholars have argued that
multilateral health agencies should be more committed
to ensuring the representation and needs of civil society
and not just those of nation-state representatives
[13-16]. This argument is based on the premise that
while nation-state representatives may embody the inter-
ests of civil society they do not necessarily convey soci-
etal needs, as they may not have relevant and timely
information about these societal needs or do not have
incentives to learn about them, hence, leading to differ-
ences in policy priorities between national governments
and civil society [15]. To avoid these gaps in societal
needs and polices, there have been calls for direct repre-
sentation by civil society and those affected by diseases
within governing mechanisms of agencies involved in
global health. Such representation, it is argued, would
enable individuals affected by diseases to share their ex-
periences with policymakers and help devise policies that
are responsive to societal needs [13,15]. However, does
representation on a governing board guarantee its
responsiveness and accountability to civil and broader
society? While representation on boards does not guar-
antee this outcome, increased presence of civil society
activists and NGOs does increase the likelihood that
their views will be heard. While the founding charters of
proto institutions in global health, such as the Global
Fund and GAVI, express commitments to civic represen-
tation and involvement in decision-making, compelling
their boards to pay attention to the needs of civil society,
Bretton Woods institutions, such as the World Bank
and the ADB, do not have civil society representation on
their boards with less possibility for civil society views to
be heard [2,3,6], an issue we explore in greater detail.
The scholarly literature has often claimed that efforts
to strengthen governance processes are the product of
individual interests among agency presidents and
governing boards, to enhance organizational effective-
ness in policy-making [1-3,5,6,8,9]. In contrast, others
have argued that the well-organized pressure from civil
society and transnational activist groups have influenced
these transformations. These groups, it is argued, have
effectively use the media to disseminate information on
the transparency of multilateral agencies, and actively
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multilateral agencies into pursuing these outcomes [5].
However, there are limitations in this body of scholarly
research. First, the focus of the research and the litera-
ture is on the reform of governance policies; but this
tells us very little. For even if board members agree to
new policies, there is no guarantee that these policies
will be enforced. It is therefore necessary to understand
why governing boards refrain from enforcing policies
they have developed. And moreover, what are the histor-
ical and contextual factors that motivate the imple-
mentation of governance policies? The aforementioned
literature is silent on these issues.
Second, earlier research has relied on the formal de-
sign of institutions, their interests, and outcomes. In ac-
cordance with the historical institutionalism literature
[17], this approach begins with the assumption that the
nature and design of governance mechanisms within
agencies, such as governing board autonomy, technical
capacity and cooperation with external members, deter-
mine the willingness and capacity of an agency to
strengthen governance processes. Yet the impact of
these governance mechanisms is questionable when
there is little evidence suggesting that governing board
members effectively adhere to and implement govern-
ance procedures. Hence, we agree with those positing
that the rational design of institutions often fails to gen-
erate predictable policy outcomes [18,19].
Third, extant studies have not adequately considered
the comparative historical origins of multilateral donor
agencies and hence, do not explain why and how
governing boards are designed the way they are, the ac-
tors and interests that created them, and how and to
what extent the institutionalization of these interests re-
mains and shapes the motivation and commitment of
subsequent agency leaders. Furthermore, extant research
has largely overlooked the evolutionary role of non-state
actors, such as civil society, and their interaction with
government officials during the formation of institutions.
Since the mid-20
th century, while many civic organiza-
tions and social health movements have worked to in-
crease awareness and knowledge on diseases affecting
vulnerable populations, the role and influence of social
health movements in global health increased in the
1990s, when these groups worked with others to estab-
lish novel international agencies, e.g., proto-institutions,
and new international policy norms of access to medi-
cine and treatment as a human right [20].
With respect to the creation of multilateral agencies,
we uphold Pierson’s [21] notion that it is not “what”
happens, but “when” it happens that is important: that
is, early interests, coalitions, and institutional designs es-
tablish self-reinforcing patterns that sustain themselves
over time, patterns that become difficult to reverse,
regardless of the introduction of policy innovations and
external pressures to change them [21]. Therefore, any
explanation of the capacity of multilateral agencies to
strengthen governance processes requires a historical
analysis of their formation.
In this article, we combine research pertaining to insti-
tutional origins and proto-institutions, approaches that
have examined historical roots, coalitions, and the polit-
ics leading to the formation of institutions [17,18,22-25],
with research on path dependency [21,26,27], in order to
reveal a deeper, more nuanced picture of the differences
among multilateral donors in strengthening their gov-
ernance processes.
Two areas of research, which examine the origins of
institutions and their capacity to better explain and pre-
dict subsequent institutional and policy behavior, pro-
vide the analytical foundation for our study. First,
research by Waldner [18] questions the efficacy of his-
torical institutionalism [28] in its ability to describe and
predict policy outcomes. This observation is based on
the premise that specific types of political institutions
often fail to generate the types of policies that are
expected of them given their institutional designs, such
as a concentration of power within the executive
(viz., the presidency) and the expectation that this con-
centration of power facilitates economic policy-making.
To avoid empirical error, Waldner [18] suggests treating
national elite preferences, conflicts, and coalitions as
variables explaining the rise of institutions as our out-
come of interest. In so doing, he claims that one can
better describe and therefore differentiate between simi-
lar types of institutions, e.g., authoritarian regimes.
Other scholars have adopted a similar approach to
Waldner [23,24,29]. For example, Donor, Ritchie, and
Slater [22] maintain that the key to understanding vari-
ation in economic bureaucratic performance is not by
treating formal bureaucratic design as causal variables,
but as outcomes of concern, with national elite interests
and coalitional survival strategies as key causes.
The second area of research that has provided analytic
underpinnings of our study examines the formation of
proto-institutions. Here, proto-institutions represent
binding formal and/or informal practices and rules of
governance within agencies and/or political institutions,
as well policy innovations, as outcomes to be explained.
These proto-institutions are the product of collabora-
tions between non-governmental organizations. The
extent of what Lawrence et al. [7] characterize as
involvement and embeddedness in relationships between
NGOs determines the likelihood of the emergence of
proto-institutions. For example, limited interaction and
sharing of information between only two NGOs, i.e.,
involvement, leads to a low likelihood of proto-
institutions emerging, whereas extensive collaborations
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tion beyond the initial collaborating parties, i.e., embed-
dedness, facilitates the diffusion of new ideas and rules
beyond these negotiations. Embeddedness, in turn, leads
to the formation of proto-institutions that are self-
reinforcing through mechanisms of rewards and sanc-
tions, thus taking on path dependent qualities.
As Figure 1 illustrates, the underlying goal of an ana-
lysis that combines institutional origins and proto-
institutions approaches is to understand the formation
of different types of institutions. This formation is based
on differences in institutions’ originating coalitions inter-
ests, which are treated as causal variables. Our outcome of
interest is the presence of governing boards that are suc-
cessful in achieving strengthened governance processes,
that is, decision-making transparency, representativeness
and inclusiveness, accountability, and responsiveness to
country and civil societal needs.
We build on the literature on institutional origins and
proto-institutions [18,19] to describe and differentiate
between different types of multilateral donors in global
health, such as the World Bank, ADB, the Global Fund,
and GAVI, by analysing in these institutions origina-
ting elite interests, coalitions, and reform strategies.
Equipped with better analysis of the origins of these
multilateral donors, we can more accurately describe,
anticipate, and understand their strengthened govern-
ance processes and, consequently, their likely adaptation
to country and civil societal needs.
Combining the institutional origins and proto-
institutions theoretical frameworks with path depend-
ency, provides still deeper insights. As Figure 1
illustrates, this combination is achieved through a tem-
poral, sequential analytical approach to explain causal
processes [21]: that is, an approach where different
theoretical frameworks and causal mechanisms are
sequentially linked to each other and used to explain dif-
ferent phases of the institutional and policy development
process [21]. As shown in Figure 1, during the initial
period of institution formation, the institutional origins
and proto-institutional literature applies, while the path
dependency literature holds true at a later point in time,
i.e., by explaining reform processes after these institu-
tions and policies have emerged.
The complimentary aspects of path dependency we
emphasize, namely power and increasing returns, are self-
reinforcing mechanisms of institutional reproduction [21].
Power mechanisms determine the concentration of re-
sources with a particular individual or group of individuals
[27,30]. When high concentration of resources combines
with political will to maintain the status quo, leaders will
not have incentives to transform institutions as they will
continuously benefit from controlling and manipulating
them, even if they are aware of the inefficiencies of the sta-
tus quo, which further underscores how firmly committed
they are to using resources for personal gain [27,30]. With
regard to increasing returns, a high level of initial financial
and technical investments into a particular institutional de-
sign locks an institution onto a particular path, even when
subsequent inefficiencies emerge [19,31]. This locking onto
a path occurs, as over time the costs of reforming the insti-
tution greatly outweigh the benefits [21].
We also emphasize the challenges of institutional and
policy-related learning. These are challenges where actors’
acquired knowledge of organizational design and policy, ac-
quired either through instruction or through inheritance of
information, provides deep familiarity and comfort with the
organization and policy, and thus creates incentives to sus-
tain existing design and policies [21,31]. Knowing the de-
tailed intricacies of a bureaucratic/policy design increases
Figure 1 Protoinstitutional formation processes.
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needed to learn new approaches [21,31]. And according to
the self-reinforcing mechanism of learning, once individuals
have learned about a particular institution/policy and have
seen its repeated effectiveness, popularity, and support, they
assign a great deal of legitimacy and decide to safeguard it,
despite its known inefficiencies [26].
Our combined analytical perspective, therefore, pro-
vides for two elements: First, by focusing on the origins
of institutions and analysing processes that lead to the
establishment of a proto-institution, we provide a more-
nuanced description of the types of multilateral donor
agencies present in global health. Second, equipped with
a more nuanced description of multilateral donor agen-
cies, we use path dependency literature to better under-
stand the causal nature of policy reform processes
within agencies and their ability to engage in strength-
ened governance processes.
Based on our proposed analytical framework, we
hypothesize that the ability of multilateral donor agen-
cies to strengthen governance process is first shaped by
the types of constituencies their governing boards con-
front. As Figure 1 illustrates, accountability of multilat-
eral donor agencies to governing institutions such as the
United Nations with entrenched nation-state interests,
or to a small group of influential nation-states, leads to
slow moving, self-reinforcing path dependent tendencies.
Conversely, when multilateral agencies are accountable
to a wide range of stakeholders involved in global health,
such as civil society, the private sector, philanthropists
and NGOs, there is greater flexibility in policy experi-
mentation and adaptation in order to strengthen
governance processes and improve responsiveness to
healthcare needs (Table 1).
The World Bank
Originally called the International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development (IBRD), the World Bank Group
emerged following the international conference held in
July 1944 in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, USA. At
this conference, 108 delegates from several nation-states
discussed the creation of an international bank that
would help European nations reconstruct their post-war
economies and would provide financial and technical as-
sistance to developing nations [4,32,33].
However, the main focus of the conference was not to
create an international development bank, but instead
an International Monetary Fund, which would bring
about international cooperation and monetary stability,
leading to, as some scholars have argued, a political co-
alition that was narrow, fragile, lacking focus, and based
on consensus [4,32,33].
The initial idea of creating an international reconstruc-
tion and development bank was put forward by the
United States (US) in 1943, by a Mr. Harry White, who
initially approached and worked closely with delegates
from the United Kingdom (UK), namely the Treasury
Secretary John Maynard Keynes, who initially hesitated
to adopt the idea, given both nations’ differences in
international economic views and policies [4,32,33].
Prior to Bretton Woods, at a meeting held in Atlantic
City, New Jersey, the US and the UK agreed to put forth
the proposal at Bretton Woods. However, at Bretton
Woods, their proposal for the bank received scant atten-
tion, while kindling debate and a lack of consensus not
only over the name of the bank but more importantly,
its focus on reconstruction (which the Europeans de-
sired) versus development (which Latin Americans
desired). Characterized by many as an “afterthought” at
Bretton Woods, delegates from the US, UK, and devel-
oping nations agreed that the proposed bank would
focus on both reconstruction and development [34].
However, the nature of the debates and the lack of atten-
tion given to the bank’s purpose created a lack of clear
and coherent consensus and commitment [33,35].
Despite a lack of strong consensus and purpose, sev-
eral conditions facilitated the emergence of the US as
the dominant coalitional partner in crafting the Bank’s
Articles of Agreement and governance structure: first,
the high level of financial prowess of the US and the size
of its initial investment, estimated at US$10 billion [32];
second, US stewardship in creating the idea of an inter-
national bank [33]; and third, the US’ geopolitical and
economic influence [33]. These factors enabled the US
Department of State and Treasury to take the lead in
drafting the core elements of the Articles of Agreement
[32,33]. Moreover, in exchange for a loan from the US,
the UK permitted the US to draft the Articles of Agree-
ment [32]. With this authority the US created Articles
that provided for high level of US influence and power,
Table 1 Multilateral donor agency governance arrangements and outcomes
Governing board membership Accountability constituents Strengthened governance processes
Bretton Woods Institutions Nation States Horizontal (within agency)
and vertical (to civil society)
Partial and/or weak
Non-Bretton Woods Institutions - Nation States Vertical (to civil society,
private sector, and nation states)
High
- Civil society
- Private sector
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Bank, positioning the Bank on US soil (thus allowing for
easier oversight and influence from the US President
and Congress), as well as establishing an informal agree-
ment that the Bank President would be an American
citizen [4,32,33].
The US also drafted Articles that secured its interests
in the Bank’s governance structure, guaranteeing the US
a high proportion of the voting shares (through invest-
ment), voting power (which is a product of these voting
shares), as well as secure and complete representation
[33]. The Articles of Agreement ensured that the largest
quota shareholders of the Bank, namely the US, UK,
Japan, and France, made up the largest voting block and
representation on the Board of Governors [4,33]. The
smaller states, which possessed a correspondingly
smaller share of investment and quota shares, had less
voting influence [4,33]. The Articles also conferred upon
the Bank’s Governing Board complete autonomy in
policy-making, without accountability to the United
Nations, the US Congress, or any other governing body
[32], essentially making the Governing Board account-
able to itself and the Board representatives of the
nation-states that invested in the Bank [6]. The Articles
were largely silent on the issue of ultimate accountabil-
ity: that is, there was no clear indication as to whom the
Board of Governors and the Executive Directors would
be accountable to [32]. This lack of clarity on account-
ability ensured the autonomy and influence of large
shareholders, but hindered the influence of stakeholders
in national governments, civil society, and the private
sector in the policy-making process. The initial elite in-
terests and coalitions emerging at Bretton Woods led to
the creation of an Articles of Agreement that hampered
the World Bank’s equitable representation and broad ac-
countability to civil society and other actors.
During the 1980s, civil society activists and NGOs
who opposed structural adjustment policies espoused by
the World Bank [36] also organized campaigns to
pressurize the World Bank to increase its accountability
and transparency [2]. In response the World Bank began
to introduce policies that increased the governing
board’s transparency, accountability, and partnership
with civil society. For example, in 1980, the World Bank
created the “NGO-World Bank Committee,” which was
made up of NGOs and Bank staff [2,9]. And in 1995,
President James Wolfenson authorized the creation of
an “NGO Liaison Officer” [2].
Beginning in the early-1990s the Bank’s Governing
Board also created Public Information Centers, which
distributed information on projects and policy analysis
[1]. By 2008, the World Bank Board had created more
than 100 Public Information Centers and 200 additional
information access points [1]. In 1993, in an effort to
increase accountability for its policy actions, the World
Bank Board agreed to the creation of the Inspection
Panel [9,37]. Through this Panel, civic groups believing
to be directly and negatively affected by World Bank
policies were able to complain and request investigations
into matters affecting them [9,37]. The Panel was
invested with the authority to request Executive Direc-
tors to look into matters warranting detailed investiga-
tion [9,37].
In 1999, the World Bank further extended its commit-
ment to stakeholder accountability and transparency by
creating the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman Office
(CAO) [1]. The CAO works directly with civil societal
groups that might be affected by the Bank’s International
Financial Corporation (IFC) and Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency’s (MIGA) procedures. The CAO
reports to the World Bank President and is strictly
accountable to that office [1].
Additionally, in an effort to further increase transpar-
ency and accountability to civil society and other stake-
holders, in December 2009 the Governing Board of the
World Bank established a new policy of increasing ac-
cess to information, in order to increase stakeholder
ownership and influence over the financing operations
of the World Bank [1]. This policy required all financial
transactions between the World Bank and lenders, as
well as documents for Executive Directors and the Board
of Governors, to be made available before Board meet-
ings and to prior to decisions and policies. The policy
was shaped by five major principles: (i) Maximizing
access to information, (ii) Clear exceptions (such as
denying access to information, should the information’s
disclosure potentially harm “well-defined interests”), (iii)
Safeguarding the deliberative process, (iv) Clear disclos-
ure procedures, and (v) Having the right to appeal deci-
sions over access to information. The overall policy was
intended not only to increase access to information, but
also to ensure more equitable and fair access to this in-
formation by stakeholders and governments [1].
While the World Bank has been lauded for recent
efforts to become more transparent, emerging as one of
first multilateral agencies to commit itself to greater
transparency and broad accountability [38], a number of
researchers have criticized the speed by which these pol-
icies have been implemented, the extent of engagement
with NGO representatives and the limited incorporation
of NGO recommendations into decision-making pro-
cesses [2,8]. By far the biggest challenge to the World
Bank, Ebrahim and Herz [2] argue, has been the
consistency of information, transparency, and account-
ability from the Governing Board to civil society, a view
shared by Jenkins [1].
In spite of visible efforts to enact policies and develop
initiatives, why has it been difficult for the World Bank
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achieve greater transparency and accountability? We
argue that the originating political elite interests and
coalitions that have established the World Bank’s ac-
countability structure created several path dependent
processes that have hindered the World Bank to effect-
ively implement policies for strengthened governance
processes. First, in line with increasing returns theory
[21], the US’ initial investment of US$10 billion, its pur-
chase of an initial 20% share of the Bank’s stock, as well
as the President and Congress’ selection of a Bank Presi-
dent and the US government’s drafting of the Articles of
Agreement led to a high level of US initial investment
into the World Bank [32]. This initial investment moti-
vated subsequent World Bank Presidents, Governing
and Executive Board Directors, as well as a supportive
Congress [39], to sustain the governance arrangements.
Indeed, Prah Ruger [40] maintains that throughout the
1970s the Governing Board was unable to respond to re-
peated demands from nation states and civil society for
greater accountability and responsiveness, especially for
health and other social welfare needs. Health policy be-
came a priority when the World Bank President, Robert
McNamara (President in 1968-81), asked his staff to
conduct studies on the importance of health in develop-
ment [40]. His actions were not prompted by govern-
ment and civil society pressures; and even when health
policy emerged as a priority under President McNamara,
it led to loans and technical advice to developing nations
[40], but not accountability and civil societal influence in
health policy decision-making [2]. Thus, in line with
increasing returns theory, an initial high investment into
an existing institution generated incentives to perpetuate
the institution’s design, purpose, and influence, notwith-
standing its acknowledged policy gaps and repeated calls
for reform.
Second, the path dependent mechanism of power
[27,30], emerging from the original coalitional arrange-
ments, facilitated in turn the Governing Board’s influ-
ence. Power in path dependent processes emerges when
actors (in this case, dominant shareholders) posses a
high degree of financial and political resources, which
facilitate their ability to make decisions and resist new
institutional and policy designs [27,30]. Following the
Bretton Woods Conference, major shareholders were
able to concentrate their power financially and become
suppliers of private sector funds through banks in major
financial centers [34].
Furthermore, the World Bank’s informal institutional
influence, mainly through bilateral agreements and loans
to powerful allies, such as France and Japan, further aug-
mented its concentrated power and influence [4,32]
through the World Bank president and the president’s
representative on the Governing Board [39].
A further path dependent factor emerging from the
World Bank’s originating coalitional politics is institu-
tional and policy learning and legitimacy [21,26,31]. As
noted earlier, these self-reinforcing mechanisms emerge
when actors within organizations master a particular
bureaucratic and policy framework, either through
sharing information or through instructions [21,26,31].
Such bureaucratic arrangements and policy frameworks
achieve critical mass as a result of their popularity and
support among key leaders, with a great deal of legitim-
acy assigned by staff to a particular bureaucratic and
policy framework. Eventually, these actors resist policy
change, even with flawed or inefficient policies, because
of the learning investment placed in the current design
and prospect of a similar type of investment any new
design would necessitate [21,26,31]. In the case of the
World Bank, scholars note that government representa-
tives involved in the creation of the Bank at Breton
Woods recognized the US, UK, and other advanced
industrialized nations’ commitment to the Bank’s
Articles of Agreement [32], with the emergence of an
organization highly committed to its mode of govern-
ance and accountability to stakeholders, creating a mode
of leadership and direction that supported the presi-
dent’s policy interest and aspirations [4,32].
Consequently, despite periodic demands for greater
accountability, and despite gradual policy movements in
this direction, it has been difficult to substantially reform
the World Bank’s approach to transparency and ac-
countability to external stakeholders to be more respon-
sive to country needs and more importantly, the needs
of civil society.
Asian Development Bank
The origins of the Asian Development Bank date back
to 1966. The ADB closely resembled the mission and
organizational structure of the World Bank. It was cre-
ated as a multilateral agency comprised of a Governing
Board of investors and Executive Directors managing
policy implementation. The overall mission of the ADB
was to provide economic and technical assistance to the
Asian region, mainly in the form of loans, to help
develop infrastructure and implement structural adjust-
ment policies; it was also created to help implement and
manage free-market systems [41,42]. Initially 31 member
countries constituted the ADB. The agency now has 67
member states [42,43]. By the late 1990s, the ADB
became more involved in addressing poverty [42], join-
ing the World Bank and other multilateral agencies to
forge partnerships with governments and civil society to
achieve this objective [44].
The political origins of the ADB were marked with
disagreements among constituent countries and a lack
of coalitional consensus. While the idea of creating a
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on discussions from members of the Economic Commis-
sion for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), the idea was ini-
tially resisted by Japan and the US [45]. Facing ongoing
stalemate, in 1963, at the 19
th session of ECAFE, the
chairman of ECAFE was able to build consensus and
secure agreement between Japan, the US and other
countries to form the ADB [45]. With the specter of
communism expanding over Southeast Asia, especially
Vietnam, the US viewed a strong regional bank helping
countries to develop and break away from communist
influence.
As two of the most influential countries investing in
the ADB’s formation, Japan and the US sought to estab-
lish a charter constitution reflecting their policy interests
as well as the views of other non-Asian industrialized
nations, often dominating those of lesser-developed
countries, as the former controlled two thirds of the vot-
ing power through their investments in the ADB [45].
Furthermore, through an informal “gentleman’s agree-
ment,” the US agreed that Japan should appoint an ADB
President, with a five-year term, to chair the Governing
Board [41,45], which some scholars explain entailed an
emphasis on infrastructural development and free mar-
ket reforms fostered by Japan and the US [45].
By the 1970s and 1980s, the ADB Governing Board
was accountable mainly to three constituents: the nation
states represented on the Governing Board, the Presi-
dent of the ADB (Japan), and board representatives from
Japan and the US. While, in theory, the Governing Board
was accountable to citizens of the member nations, in
reality such direct lines of representation did not
materialize [41,42]. Initially, the ADB did not establish a
close relationship with civil society and, therefore, it was
not accountable to them [41,42]. In several instances, for
example, the ADB often negotiated with government
officials for the financing of specific policies without
incorporating the views of civil society [41]. In 2001, for
example, in Thailand, the villagers from Klong Dan
village (located near Bangkok) complained that they had
not been consulted prior to the ADB and government’s
approved funding of a wastewater treatment facility in
Klong Dan, requesting reassessment of the project and
for the ADB board to increase its accountability and in-
terests to their needs in the future [46].
In 1999 a Special Evaluation Study conducted by the
ADB discovered a shortfall between the intended and ac-
tual participation of NGOs in ADB projects as well as
their participation in these projects [47], recommending
that before projects are approved, the ADB must make it
“mandatory to include an agreed upon and verifiable
monitoring system for NGO/CSO involvement in a
project or program before it is approved” [8,47]. The
study found “ADB’s capacity to mange and exchange
information on the progress of NGO/CBO involvement
and lessons learned from previous projects remains
underdeveloped” [6,47].
Over the years, Japan, through its control over the
Governing Board and the Presidency, along with the US,
continued to have the greatest informal influence over
policy decisions [45,48]. Together their economic policy
ideologies, interests and strategies were learned, adopted,
and implemented within the ADB [49], leading to the
development of a multilateral agency that was account-
able mainly to its largest financial contributors, rather
than a diverse group of stakeholders representing a wide
array of policy interests, ideologies, and beliefs.
By the 1990s, the governing structure of the ADB
evolved along a predictable policy path, where, in line
with path dependency theories of power concentration
[27,31], ongoing financial and political investments by
the largest shareholders helped strengthen their interests
and policy influence [48]. Moreover, a path dependent
instance of institutional learning occurred [19,31],
whereby executive directors and especially staff mem-
bers aligned themselves with Japan that was in charge of
the Governing Board and the 12 Executive Directors
[49]. This dominance limited the emergence of new pol-
icy ideas, such as to balance approaches fostering market
based policies with those emphasizing poverty alleviation
and equity in social welfare [42].
The challenges associated with these path dependency
constraints, which emerged from the ADB’s originating
coalitional politics, was a multilateral agency that was
not fully capable of adapting to changing health environ-
ments and country needs, especially given ADB’s histo-
rically weak partnership and accountability to civil
society. By the mid-1990s, the ADB attempted to rectify
this problem through the creation of formal channels of
communication [44], such as the creation of an “NGO
Center” in 2000 [5,44], an “NGO Cooperation Network”
in 2002 [5,44], a “Public Communications Policy” in
2003 [42], and the creation of an “Accountability Mech-
anism” that same year [50]. All of these representative
institutions were created in order to learn from and
work with NGOs, and were important for obtaining in-
formation about ongoing health and other social welfare
needs. While some scholars consider the ADB as being
transparent when compared to other multilateral agencies
[51], others have argued that the ADB has not consistently
engaged with civil society [42], limiting its ability to learn
and adapt to new health conditions and citizens’ health
needs, and that important information, such as policy divi-
sions and partnerships with the private sector, have been
withheld from civil society [5,42,51]. Despite the visible
initiatives to work closely with civil society, the views and
interests of civil society have not been formally adopted
into the policy-making processes [5,41,44]. Instead, the
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Governing Board [52,53].
Despite country needs for greater funding for public
health [54], the ADB governing board does not appear to
have prioritized health for investment [41,54]. Funding for
health, nutrition, and social protection was second to last
of the board’s investment categories in 2007, at US $95
million [41], an amount which does not reflect increased
country needs for funding medical treatment, infrastruc-
ture, and health systems [41,42,48,49]. The unique political
origins of the ADB, and the path dependent nature of the
governing board’s structure appears to have reduced re-
sponsiveness to countries’ and citizens’ health needs
[49,55,56], leading some scholars to argue for greater trans-
parency, accountability, and equal participation within the
ADB’s governing board [42,56]. But as Chavez [56] explains
“there are just too many elements of the governance
principle that threaten the very foundations of the Bank.”
GAVI
The Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization was
established in 2000. The originating interests and coali-
tions involved in forming GAVI differed from the ADB
and the World Bank as they included a diverse body of
actors, ranging from leaders of multilateral donor agen-
cies (such as the World Bank, UNICEF, and WHO),
philanthropic organizations, to the private sector, civil
society, and academia [57-62].
In 1998, in response to a decline in international atten-
tion and financing for the vaccination of children in low-
income countries, the World Bank President, James
Wolfensohn, convened a summit in Washington D.C.,
bringing together the leaders of multilateral agencies,
pharmaceutical companies, academia, and civil society, to
explore how declining immunization levels could be
addressed [58,60]. Concerned with the formation of yet
another multilateral agency for health [57], summit mem-
bers agreed to form an international partnership [60].
Shortly after the summit, philanthropist Bill Gates
convened a special dinner that included the working
group established by the Bank President James
Wolfensohn, potential funders, activists, and representa-
tives of NGOs. At this meeting the attendees explored
innovative solutions and funding mechanisms to make
available vaccines for children [60]. A second summit
meeting was held in Bellagio, Italy, in 1999, bringing to-
gether key UN agencies, leaders of the vaccine industry,
representatives of bilateral donor agencies, foundations,
and civil society to create a new global partnership called
the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation, with
the remit to expand access to vaccines for children
[58,60]. In November 1999, Bill Gates pledged US$780
million to the Fund for the Vaccination of Children,
which fell under GAVI’s purview.
In 2000, at the World Economic Forum in Davos,
Switzerland, the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan offi-
cially announced the establishment of GAVI that
brought together public and private sector actors and in-
terests [59,61], with a mission to guarantee and improve
access to immunization for children; expand the use of
existing cost-effective and safe vaccines; accelerate the
development and introduction of new vaccines; and
make immunization coverage an integral part of inter-
national development initiatives [59].
The diverse coalition of actors governing GAVI there-
fore shared similar policy interests and beliefs. First, all
actors were interested in creating a diverse and inclusive
governing body, which included individuals that could
bring extensive knowledge and experience in providing
immunization services. Second, all agreed that they
would share their experience, talents, resources, and
comparative advantages [62]. Third, they were unified in
the belief that all children should have access to
immunization and healthcare services [60,61]. Fourth,
the coalition of actors believed that civil society should
be an integral part of GAVI’s governance structure and
delivery system [57,61,63,64].
Initially two boards of representatives governed GAVI.
First, the Governing Board, which comprised four renew-
able representatives: the World Bank, WHO, UNICEF,
and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, and second, the
Alliance Board, consisting of eleven rotating members,
which includes several low- and high-income countries,
such as Bhutan, Mali, Canada, the Netherlands and
Norway, the pharmaceutical sector, the Rockefeller Foun-
dation, research institutions, such as the US National
Institutes of Health (NIH), and NGOs, such as Gates Chil-
dren’s Vaccine Program and PATH [59].
In contrast to the BW institutions of the ADB and the
World Bank, there was no single dominant actor within
GAVI’s two governing boards. While a chairperson was
elected for GAVI’s Governing Board, all participating ac-
tors agreed on an equal representation of board members
and diversity of opinion [64], and also, that no country,
constituency or organization should have control of the
board. This inclusive arrangement has helped to ensure a
diverse array of opinions and policy preferences. Although,
others have argued that this governance arrangement has
led to board member contestation over legislation [64],
this arrangement has enabled all actors to contribute to
GAVI’s governance and decision-making.
In further contrast to the BW institutions, civil society
was involved in the formation of GAVI since its incep-
tion and had a permanent role on both governing
boards, where the NGO representatives were guaranteed
a seat, as their views and involvement were perceived to
be critical in expanding immunization services to chil-
dren in low-income countries [65,66]. NGOs also played
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governance, essentially being ‘the arms and ears of
GAVI’. In contrast to the other board members, NGOs
have provided a wealth of information on the design of
programs, development of immunization policies, and
effective ways of collaborating with local governments
[61]. Since GAVI’s foundation, NGOs have been heavily
involved in policy-making, holding governments ac-
countable for their use of GAVI funding [61,65], increas-
ing awareness of countries’ immunization challenges, as
well as fund raising [66].
An inclusive board structure ensured a governance
arrangement that was more responsive to a wider range
of views, ideas, experiences, and interests with account-
ability to a wide array of stakeholders, [59,64] with no
dominant board member(s) [64], despite the bulk of
GAVI funding initially coming from the Gates Founda-
tion and the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan,
France, and the Netherlands [64]. Moreover, an inclusive
and diverse board membership was maintained following
the restructuring of GAVI boards from two to one [62],
when civil society, NGOs and the private sector were
able to maintain their one third overall representation
on the new GAVI board [62].
In contrast to the ADB and the World Bank, GAVI’sd i -
verse governance structure has enabled the organization
to respond to emerging needs, priorities, and increased
demand for vaccines by creating innovative funding mech-
anisms and strategies [57]. In response to requests from
recipient countries, in 2009 GAVI’s board collaborated
with the WHO, the World Bank, and the Global Fund to
strengthen country health systems, especially human re-
sources, and in developing supply chain management sys-
tems for vaccine distribution [57,62].
Since its inception, GAVI has made efforts to increase
its accountability and responsiveness to civil society.
This has been achieved through new policy initiatives
and funding to ensure increased involvement of NGOs,
not only for the implementation of immunization pro-
grams, but also on various policy committees, such as
the Programme and Policy Committee and the Govern-
ance Committee, signaling to other board members that
civil society is a vital partner for GAVI [57,61,62,65,67].
The Global Fund
At the end of the 1990s, as the adverse health and eco-
nomic consequences of the AIDS epidemic in Africa, Asia,
and the Caribbean became evident, concerns grew world-
wide on the negative impact of AIDS on development and
global security. At the time, the lack of availability of a
range of preventive and treatment interventions prompted
activists and communities affected by AIDS to call for
expanding access to life saving antiretroviral drugs to
those in need as a human right. A vibrant and extensive
global AIDS movement was born.
Suddenly, the AIDS epidemic and global health was at
the nexus of economic development, human rights, and
global security. Spurred by civil society, AIDS activists,
the international health and development community,
an international coalition of non-governmental organiza-
tions, bilateral donors, and global leaders formed to look
for new ways to address AIDS, going beyond the existing
international health, development, and financing agen-
cies [68].
In 2000, AIDS and global health were discussed at the
G8 meeting in Okinawa, Japan [68], with an acknow-
ledgement of the need to provide large financial re-
sources for AIDS. Soon after, the African Leaders
Summit, held in April 2001 in Nigeria, called on donor
countries as well as countries in Africa, through the
Abuja Declaration, to make available finances to address
HIV and AIDS in the continent [69]. At the summit,
Kofi Annan, the United Nations Secretary General,
called for the creation of a global fund to channel new
funding to address the epidemic [68].
What happened next was unprecedented in the history
of global health, a United Nations General Assembly
Special Session on AIDS (UNGASS), held in June 2001
[70]. The UNGASS meeting was the first time the
United Nations General Assembly had specifically fo-
cused on a disease, with an overwhelming support and
commitment for a resolution to create a fund to address
AIDS. Shortly after the UNGASS meeting, in July 2001,
the G8 meeting in Genoa, Italy, endorsed the creation of
a global fund with financing provided predominantly by
the donor countries.
During this process, civil society, i.e., NGOs and activ-
ists, played an important role in bringing together the
private sector, representatives of developed and develop-
ing countries, and other supportive organizations to help
construct a global fund for combating AIDS [71,72].
These coalition-building efforts were facilitated by civil
society’s drive to increase awareness, target new part-
ners, and widely share information on funding and epi-
demiology [73]. NGOs and activists ensured broad
media coverage of the event, raising the visibility of
AIDS and the role of civil society in the fight against
AIDS, as well as through targeted advocacy campaigns
aimed at important decision-makers in government.
Moreover, NGOs and activists worked assiduously to
pressure governments and bilateral donors to finance a
global response to AIDS [72].
Following the Genoa meeting, a multi-stakeholder
Transitional Working Group, comprising bilateral do-
nors, multilateral health and financing agencies, civil so-
ciety, communities affected by AIDS and the private
sector, was established and met in Brussels to develop a
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Fund [71]. At this meeting, members of civil society, such
as activists with a particular disease and NGO representa-
tives, took the lead in creating a governing board member-
ship structure that guaranteed civil society’sr e p r e s e n t a t i o n
and participation in major funding decisions [72]. Civil
society members were chosen regardless of their personal
experiences, policy views, and interests. During this
period, civil society representatives succeeded in stressing
the need for their inclusiveness in policy decision-making,
as well as a balanced, fair, and transparent discussion of
funding priorities and policies [73].
The deliberations of the Transitional Working Group
led to the development of a Framework Document [13],
which identified the set of principles on the governance,
structure, focus and operations of the Global Fund.
These principles guide the Global Fund to: (i) Operate
as a financial instrument, not an implementing entity;
(ii) make available and leverage additional financial re-
sources; (iii) support programs that evolve from national
plans and priorities; (iv) operate in a balanced manner in
terms of different regions, diseases and interventions; (v)
pursue an integrated and balanced approach to prevention
and treatment; evaluate proposals through independent
review processes, and (vi) operate with transparency and
accountability [74]. The principle of supporting programs
that evolve from country national plans and strategies
underpins country ownership and the active participation
of civil society.
Indeed one of the key normative claims underpinning
the Framework Document is the Global Fund Board’s
belief and commitment to fully representing the views,
experiences, and needs of civil society [13]. It is a belief
that stems from the realization that in order to create
policies that effectively represent the views and needs of
those affected by HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and Malaria,
civil society’s participation is equally if not more legitim-
ate and helpful than representatives from government
and/or the private sector [72,73]. Indeed Governing
Board decisions balance civil society needs with those of
the government and/or private sector [72]. This ap-
proach breaks from the “business as usual” [72] model
where representatives of nation states have historically
designed and implemented policy. The Global Fund
Framework Document, therefore, has helped civil soci-
etal representation and strengthened governance pro-
cesses [72,73].
Thanks in part to civil society’s stewardship in creating
the Global Fund, its governance structure was character-
ized by broad multi-stakeholder involvement at all levels,
the Board, the Committees of the Board, and the Country
Coordinating Mechanisms (CCMs) at country level [13].
The Board is diverse in its nature and consists of 20
voting members and eight non-voting members [13].
All Board Members represent “constituencies” compris-
ing “a group of communities, networks, governments
or institutions”, namely:
(i) ‘Donor Countries’ that provide financial
contributions to the Global Fund and have 8 seats;
(ii) ‘Implementing Countries’, that have seven seats and
represent the low and middle-income countries
benefiting from Global Fund financing and which
are grouped according to the six World Health
Organization regions, plus an additional seat for
Africa;
(iii)‘Communities’ (one seat) affected by AIDS,
tuberculosis and malaria;
(iv)‘Civil Society from Developing Countries’ (one seat)
that consist of NGOs that are based in
implementing countries, including faith-based
organizations, health service providers, advocacy
groups and professional associations, coordinated
by the international Council of AIDS Service
Organizations (ICASO);
(v) ‘Civil Society from Developed Countries’ (one seat)
that include NGOs based in Western Europe, the
United States, Canada, Japan, Australia and New
Zealand, as well as international nongovernmental
organizations with headquarters in developed
countries;
(vi)‘Private Sector’ (one seat) coordinated by the Global
Business Council on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and
Malaria, and;
(vii)‘Foundations’ (one seat) which provide financial and
resource support to the Fund.
Non-voting constituencies that collectively have eight
seats and consist of the ‘Partners’ constituency (which
includes Roll Back Malaria Partnership, Stop TB
Partnership and UNITAID), the United Nations con-
stituency (which includes the United Nations Joint
Programme on HIV/AIDS [UNAIDS] and the World
Health Organization), as well as the World Bank, which
also acts as the Trustee of the Global Fund [75].
In addition to the Board, Committees and the CCMs,
the Global Fund also incorporates a Partnership Forum as
part of its governance structure. The Partnership Forum,
which meets once every 18 months to two years, is inclu-
sive, bringing together a broad range of stakeholders that
includes among others grant recipients, civil society,
NGOs, affected communities, donors, international insti-
tutions, technical agencies, research organizations, aca-
demic community, foundations, and private business. As
set in the Global Fund by-laws, the Partnership Forum
“provides an important and visible platform for debate, ad-
vocacy, continued fundraising, and inclusion of new part-
ners.” It is an important “communication channel for
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where in the governance structure.” The Partnership
Forum reviews progress based on reports from the Board,
provides input to Global Fund strategy and helps set its
direction [76]. The Partnership Forum provides the oppor-
tunity for the governing board to understand the needs of
civil society and respond to their requests [72]. For ex-
ample, in 2006 in Durban more than 414 people, compris-
ing activists, NGOs, and private sector representatives
from 118 countries, met with Global Fund board members
[77]; the goal of this Partnership Forum meeting was for
the board to obtain feedback from Global Fund opera-
tions, learn about medical and prevention needs, to re-
spond and incorporate society’s policy recommendations,
which ultimately led to the Global Fund Strategy report of
2007 [77].
The CCMs are multi-sectoral institutions that bring
together representatives of governments, bilateral do-
nors, multilateral agencies, civil society, NGOs, faith-
based institutions, academic institutions, private sector,
and communities affected by AIDS, tuberculosis and
malaria. The CCMs coordinate the development and
submission of proposals for funding requests to the
Global Fund and oversee grant implementation.
Over the years, the creation of a multi-sectoral
governing board within the Global Fund has led to a board
that is accountable and responsive to the needs of civil so-
ciety and governments. Because NGOs, individuals
afflicted by particular diseases, and the private sector are
guaranteed a voice on the board, and because there is a
very strong connection between civil society and trans-
national activist groups [77,78], the board responds to and
incorporates requests on ways to improve its policy-
making and financial assistance to grant recipients. The
Global Fund board has responded to country needs for
financing health systems responses for AIDS, TB, and mal-
aria, mainly through enhanced supply chains for antiretro-
viral medications, human resources, and training [79]. A
study by the International Center on Research for Woman
found that the board and executive management demon-
strated a high level of commitment to responding to civil
society’s recommendations for how to improve funding
for medical treatment, prevention activities (especially in
the area of gender and human rights), while highlighting
the ease with which civil society board members could ap-
proach the Chair and Executive Director and the latter’s
willingness to hear and respond to their concerns [80].
The study noted that following representations by activists
and the NGO representatives on the Board for the full dis-
closure of the working policy documents of the board, the
Chair of the board and other board members responded
by adopting the Global Fund Documents Policy,w h i c h
details 10 categories of documents that are routinely made
public [80].
In 2003 the Global Fund Board created a “Civil Society
Team” within the Global Fund’s External Relations Unit;
this Team frequently met with activist and NGOs in
Geneva or in recipient countries in order to learn about
their needs for accessing drugs and providing prevention
services while discussing and incorporating their recom-
mendations during board meetings [47]. Further, the
Board has created various forums in which NGOs are en-
couraged to participate, to share their views, and where
Global Fund board members and staff can learn about
needs and incorporate them into policy decisions [47]. All
of these efforts have convinced analysts that the Global
Fund’s governing board is indeed committed to being both
responsive and accountable to civil society, learning from
them and incorporating their views [47,80].
The strong involvement of civil society in the creation
of the Global Fund has meant that governance arrange-
ments have guarded the interests of civil society, affected
communities, and implementing countries. Although the
accountability of the Board and senior officials to
taxpayers who provide almost 95% of Global Fund finan-
cing is not necessarily clear, the organization’s respon-
siveness to civil society is a marked break from the BW
institutions already discussed.
Conclusion
The rich diversity of political and civil societal interests
that shape the formation of domestic political institu-
tions are also present during the formation of multilat-
eral donor agencies in global health. Multilateral
agencies committed to helping nations overcome health
challenges exhibit vast differences in their political and
civic origins. These origins not only provide us with a
more accurate indication of the type of multilateral
agencies that they are, e.g., Bretton Woods versus proto-
institutions, but they also provide insights into why and
how agencies behave differently. By focusing on multilat-
eral donor agencies’ strengthened governance processes,
our analytical approach has highlighted considerable
variation in these outcomes between these different
types of multilateral donors in global health.
The Global Fund and GAVI, for example, were more
responsive to civil society’s health needs, which included
obtaining medications for essential medicines, healthcare
treatment, as well as information for awareness and pre-
vention, and were more willing to institutionalize their
interests early on. These needs are often the product of
objective assessments of drug shortages and funding for
prevention and treatment conducted by activists affected
by these diseases, as well those NGOs that represent
them. But it is important to note that not all activists
and NGOs are successful in increasing awareness, com-
municating needs, and mobilizing a response to disease.
In Brazil, for example, while activists and NGOs have
Gómez and Atun Globalization and Health 2013, 9:18 Page 13 of 17
http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/9/1/18succeeded in achieving their objectives for AIDS, less
funding, volunteer experience, and the stigma attached
to tuberculosis as a disease of the poor, tuberculosis ac-
tivists have been less successful [81,82]. Future research
will need to compare and explain why some health sec-
tors are more successful than others in communicating
their needs, mobilizing, and thus providing more effect-
ive representation within multilateral health agencies.
In contrast, while the BW institutions of the World
Bank and the Asian Development Bank also expressed
commitments in achieving these outcomes, they experi-
enced challenges in implementing reforms to achieve
greater responsiveness and accountability to civil society.
We have argued that differences in these strengthened
governance processes reflect differences in the political
and civil societal factors leading to the formation of
these multilateral agencies. When these agencies were
crafted by political elites from advanced industrialized
nations, initial discussions, coalitions, and governance
boards were shaped by those same elites; over time, their
interests superseded competing interests, which sought
to develop more accountable institutions. Conversely,
when multilateral agencies were initiated and created by
civil society, as well as other non-governmental sectors,
such as the private sector, this led to the formation of
coalitions and governing boards that were more repre-
sentative to civil societal needs. These proto-institutions,
i.e., the Global Fund and GAVI, were more capable in
adapting, responding to, and incorporating the needs of
not only civil society, but other emerging actors as well,
such as affected communities, philanthropic agencies,
and private sector institutions that play an important
role in the global health landscape.
In addition, a key takeaway message emerges from our
study: that is, because of the diversity and early coalition
building processes that characterized the establishment
of the Global Fund and GAVI, the governing boards of
these proto institutions were able to avoid the path
dependency problems experienced by the established
multilateral agencies of the World Bank and the ADB
with origins in Bretton Woods. It therefore seems that
in the future, the only agencies that will be capable of
avoiding these path dependency problems are those that
were recently created and/or new agencies established
by a diverse array of state and non-state actors. Our
approach therefore helps to explain why not only the
World Bank and ADB, but other older BW institutions,
such as the WHO, have had a difficult time strengthen-
ing its governance processes [83].
As the factors that determine the accountability and
responsiveness of multilateral donor agencies depend on
their originating coalitional politics, we suggest an
approach that combines the literature addressing the
non-institutional political origins of institutions, proto-
institutions, and path dependency theory. A particular
advantage with our proposed origins and proto-
institutional approach is that it helps to explain the ac-
tors, interests, and coalitions leading to the formation of
governance arrangements within multilateral agencies,
the board structure, rules, and accountability processes.
Path dependency theory also helps to provide insight
into the board’s subsequent policy beliefs, interests, and
reform strategies, and to what extent self-reinforcing
mechanisms such as increasing returns and legitimacy
create disincentives to purse reform. This was the case
with the BW institutions of the World Bank and ADB
but not GAVI and the Global Fund. When combined, we
have argued that a framework accounting for the origins
and subsequent institutional logic of multilateral agencies
helps to more accurately describe the types of multilateral
donors that they are, as well as helping to explain their
capacity to adapt to ongoing country and civil societal
healthcare needs. Through our framework, moreover, we
also found that BW institutions have not been as effective
as the more recently established proto-institutions in
achieving strengthened governance processes.
But there are also policy implications associated with
these strengthened governance processes. First, by
achieving this outcome, funding policies may be
designed more effectively to meet citizens and countries’
healthcare needs. This is because increased representa-
tion, accountability, and responsiveness helps to ensure
that governing boards have the most accurate, up to date
information that they need in order to make sound pol-
icy decisions. And second, strengthening transparency
and accountability to civil society increases the likeli-
hood that funding will be used effectively and for the
right purposes.
While we have suggested a new approach to explaining
differences between the strengthened governance pro-
cesses of multilateral donor agencies, we have not
addressed the differences within BW and proto-
institutions. With respect to similar types of BW institu-
tions, scholars will need to examine to what extent and
how they vary in terms of governing boards’ willingness
and commitment to become more accountable, respon-
sive, and inclusive of civil societal needs, and the factors
that account for these differences.
The global economic recession and reduced contribu-
tions to multilateral funders of global health may lead to
de-legitimization of existing policy views and traditions
in governance and accountability and precipitate institu-
tional conversion [83-86]. Perhaps the need for greater
efficiency when targeting and using multilateral funds
will force governing boards to restructure themselves
and become more open, accountable, and inclusive
of civil societal recommendations. Scholars will need
to examine differences in the impact of exogenous
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responding differently to these new environments. It
may certainly be the case that some BW institutions,
such as the World Bank, will become more accountable
and responsive, as compared with other BW institutions,
such as the ADB and/or the African Development Bank,
whose financial budget and funding contributions, as
well as global attention and responsibility, are compara-
tively smaller.
Finally, scholars may seek to establish differences
between similar types of proto-institutions. To what ex-
tent, for example, has the new economic climate and a
decrease in financial contributions to the Global Fund
led to subtle yet fundamental differences in governing
board accountability and responsiveness to civil societal
needs? Furthermore, in a context of increased need for
global health funding, has the rise in influence of philan-
thropic organizations, such as the Bill & Melinda Gates
Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation, strength-
ened the influence of NGOs and community-based orga-
nizations which they fund, and has this, in turn,
increased civil society’s influence within the Global Fund
and GAVI? Have these private donors become more in-
fluential within the Global Fund and GAVI and how has
this influenced donor priorities? Future researchers will
need to address these questions, closely examining the
external factors that may lead to differences in proto-
institutional accountability and responsiveness in the
new climate of economic uncertainty.
Endnotes
a Note, however, that agencies need not address all
of these aspects of health governance in order to
strengthen them. As the case studies of the World Bank,
ADB, the Global Fund, and GAVI will illustrate, these
agencies varied in terms of the aspects of health govern-
ance that they addressed.
b In our causal argument, we certainly acknowledge
the presence of causal endogeneity. This is because indi-
viduals having participated in creating governance struc-
tures in these agencies often eventually sit on the very
governing boards that they created, possessing the same
policy interests and incentives; these board members in
turn affect subsequent reform coalition processes and
governance outcomes. We find endogeneity to be per-
missible if the goal is to explain the rise of a particular
institution (e.g., agency), which is the case in our ap-
proach; conversely, it is unsuitable if our interest is in
establishing independent casual variables and outcomes.
c It is important to note, however, that the BW institu-
tions have many more health and social welfare sectors
to govern – approximately 19 – when compared to
the proto-institutions involved in global health. This
excessive amount of responsibility may pose greater
challenges for strengthening governance processes in the
BW versus the proto-institutions. Future research will
need to compare and assess governance processes within
different types of health and social welfare sectors within
the BW institutions and to see if this complexity is ham-
pering efforts to strengthen governance processes.
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